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Recent research on attentional control processes in the Eriksen flanker task has focused on
the so-called congruency sequence effect a.k.a. the Gratton effect, which is the observation
of a smaller flanker interference effect after incongruent than after congruent trials.There is
growing support for the view that in this paradigm, the congruency sequence effect is due
to repetition of the target or response across trials. Here, results from two experiments are
presented that separate the contributions of target, flanker, and response repetition. The
results suggest that neither response repetition alone nor conflict is necessary to produce
the effect. Instead, the data reveal that only flanker repetition is sufficient to produce con-
gruency sequence effects. In other words, information that is associated with a response
irrespective whether it is relevant for the current trial is bound to response representations.
An account is presented in which the fleeting event files are the activated part of the task
set in which flankers, targets, and response representations are associatively linked and
updated through conflict-modulated reinforcement learning.
Keywords: flanker task, cognitive control, conflict monitoring, sequential dependencies, associative learning,
episodic binding
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive psychological research has shown that when a partic-
ipant is instructed to make a response to a target stimulus, he
or she is typically slower and less accurate when distractors are
present. This is even the case despite receiving instructions to
ignore these distractors and having had extensive practice on trials
with targets and distractors. Theorists who address this distrac-
tor interference effect generally refer to these tasks as conflict or
congruency tasks. However, there is great disagreement about how
participants exert cognitive control in these tasks. Although some
theories have been presented in great detail, by using computa-
tional methods, ambiguities still remain. One such computational
theory of cognitive control in conflict tasks (Botvinick et al., 2001)
has had such a substantial impact on the field that it spawned a
plethora of investigations focusing on the precise neurocognitive
mechanisms underlying conflict-modulated cognitive control and
questioning the sufficiency and necessity of conflict to observe
cognitive control.
Research has largely focused on three types of conflict tasks. In
the Stroop (1935) task (for a review see MacLeod, 1991), partic-
ipants are instructed to name the color of a word as quickly and
accurately as possible. The word itself refers to a color, allowing
the creation of congruent words, such as the word “green” in green
font color, and incongruent words, such as the word “blue” in red
font color. The second task is the Simon or spatial compatibility
task (Simon and Rudell, 1967), in which a stimulus (letter, word,
or symbol) is presented on the left or right side of the computer
screen. The participant is required to press a left or right but-
ton based on the stimulus content while ignoring the stimulus
location. For example, a congruent trial could be the word LEFT
presented on the left side of the screen and an incongruent trial
could be the word LEFT on the right side of the screen. Finally, in
the flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974), a central target char-
acter is flanked by distractors. There are more distractors than
targets and the distractors may be identical to the target (congru-
ent trial) or different than the target. In response-incongruent (RI)
trials, the identity of the distractors is associated with the opposite
response as the target.
These three tasks have largely been treated as identical in terms
of the control processes involved, which has led to theorists mak-
ing inferences and predictions about one task based on published
findings in another task. In fact, the influence of stimulus repeti-
tions differs greatly between the Stroop and flanker tasks (Mayr
et al., 2003). In addition, the comparisons of response time distrib-
utions are fundamentally different (Spieler et al., 2000; Pratte et al.,
2010), which may reflect differences in perceptual, response, and
control processes. Thus, even though much of the research on con-
flict processing has used the Stroop and Simon tasks, those results
can not readily be assumed to hold for flanker tasks. As it turns
out, the flanker task is the odd one out when it comes to the effects
of repetition of stimuli across trials (as will be discussed below)
and is the only task that consistently falsified a necessary predic-
tion of the conflict/control-loop model (Botvinick et al., 2001).
This has led to a number of new models of conflict-modulated
cognitive control that appeal to additional control processes (Blais
et al., 2007; Verguts and Notebaert, 2008; Davelaar and Stevens,
2009). This paper continues this approach and addresses the rela-
tive influence of distractors on congruency sequence effects in the
flanker task.
Our starting point is the work by Botvinick et al. (1999, 2001);
Kerns et al., 2004; see also Davelaar, 2008a). In several studies
using the Stroop and flanker tasks, they observed that the anterior
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cingulate cortex (ACC), a frontal brain structure, is more activated
in response to processing incongruent than congruent stimuli.
Their theoretical innovation was that the ACC may be monitor-
ing the amount of conflict in a trial and at the system level this
measured conflict is used to enhance the amount of control on the
next trial. Thus, the more conflict on trial n, the more control on
trial n+ 1. This would lead to a particular interaction called the
congruency sequence effect or the Gratton effect, which has been
interpreted as a signature of cognitive control in conflict tasks. The
congruency sequence effect (Gratton et al., 1992) is the finding of
a lower interference effect after an incongruent trial compared to
the effect after a congruent trial (see Figure 1A). Congruent trials
after an incongruent or congruent trial are referred to as iC and cC
trials, respectively, whereas incongruent trials after an incongruent
or congruent trial are referred to as iI and cI trials. The Botvinick-
model explains congruency sequence effects as follows. On trial n,
the incongruent stimulus leads to an increase in conflict, which is
detected by the ACC. On trial n+ 1, this increased conflict leads
to more control, causing distracting information to be ignored
more efficiently. Thus, incongruent (iI) and congruent (iC) trials
will be responded to more quickly and more slowly, respectively.
Although this pattern is observed in all three conflict tasks, several
unresolved issues remain.
The first unresolved issue is that not all interactions between
the previous and current trial type are created equal. Figures 1B,C
show examples of an interaction pattern with the same interaction
effect (100 ms). In Figure 1B, there is no control over incongruent
trials, whereas in Figure 1C, the congruent trials are unaffected
(cf., Kerns et al., 2004). Figure 1D has the same interaction effect,
but would not fit the theoretical description of a Gratton effect.
Finally, Figure 1E presents another interaction with the same effect
size, but in this case there is a reversed interference effect after
incongruent trials. This pattern is impossible to obtain with the
Botvinick-model, as the theoretical limit is the complete absence
(or perfectly ignoring) of distractors, which would lead to equal
response times for iI and iC trials.
The reversal depicted in Figure 1E is most often found in the
Simon task (Hommel et al., 2004) and is readily explained within
the feature-integration account of sequential effects in the Simon
task (Hommel et al., 2004). Specifically, the account assumes that
stimulus and response representations on a trial get bound into
a single representation called an event file. When part of the
stimulus-response ensemble is repeated the remaining parts are
reactivated. In the original account, subsequent trials that involve
stimuli that partially match (and partially mismatch) the content
of the event file lead to confusion and thus longer response times.
Response times to stimuli that completely match or completely
mismatch are assumed not to differ. Applied to the flanker task,
the following is expected based on the feature-integration account.
Assume that the stimuli are left- and right-pointing arrows, such
as <<<<< and >>>>> as congruent trials and <<><< and
>><>> as incongruent trials. To distinguish between <<<<<
followed by <<<<< and <<<<< followed by >>>>>, the
reference to the trials include whether the response repeats (e.g.,
cCr) or alternates (e.g., cCn; “n” for non-repetition). When the
response repeats across trials, iIr and cCr trials are complete repe-
titions and will lead to faster response times compared to cIr and
iCr trials. Dependent on the overall flanker interference effect,
FIGURE 1 | Five interaction patterns with the same interaction effect
[RTcI−RTcC− (RTiI−RTiC)]. The previous trial type is either congruent (CON) or
incongruent (INC). The interaction effect is the observation of larger flanker
interference effect (RTincongruent−RTcongruent) after CON trials than after INC trials.
The original explanations of congruency sequence effects explain pattern (A).
The same interaction effect size can be obtained with patterns that have no
sequence effects for incongruent (B) or congruent (C) trials. Pattern (D)
indicates worse control for incongruent trials after an incongruent trial. Patern
(E) shows a congruency reversal. Pattern (C) can be obtained in Stroop tasks,
whereas pattern (E) is found in Simon tasks.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science January 2013 | Volume 3 | Article 552 | 2
Davelaar Priming and cognitive control
the final pattern will either resemble Figures 1A,E. The pattern
is the same when the response alternates across trials. For exam-
ple, iIn and cCn trials are complete mismatches whereas iCn and
cIn are incomplete mismatches. Evidence in favor of the feature-
integration account comes predominantly from studies employing
the Simon task (Hommel et al., 2004) and supports the claim that
specialized conflict-related processes (as assumed in the Botvinick-
model) are not necessary to explain the congruency sequence
effect.
Despite the success of the feature-integration account, both it
and the conflict/control-loop hypothesis require further exten-
sions in order to explain the pattern of sequential effects in the
flanker task, which constitutes the second unresolved issue. Specif-
ically, in the flanker task, the two-way interaction that resembles
Figure 1A is found only when the response/target repeats across
trials. When the response/target changes, the interaction is absent
with the effects of the previous and current trial on response
times being completely additive (i.e., parallel lines; Mayr et al.,
2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006; Bugg, 2008; Davelaar and Stevens,
2009)1. Interestingly, the original results reported in Gratton et al.
(1992) reveals the same three-way interaction, but this was not
analyzed. There is some variation across experiments with the
effect of previous trial congruency with iCn and iIn being (equally)
slower than cCn and cIn, respectively, which is due to an increase
in the response threshold after a conflict trial (Davelaar, 2009).
To date, despite the introduction of new models of the flanker
task (Hübner et al., 2010; White et al., 2011; see for debate, Hübner
and Töbel, 2012) no computational theory has been put forward
that accounts for this three-way interaction pattern. However,
variations on the Botvinick-model with and without some ele-
ments of the feature-integration account have been proposed to
address Stroop and Simon tasks (Blais et al., 2007; Verguts and
Notebaert, 2008). These were then falsely assumed to also account
for findings in the flanker task. An account that would be able
to capture the three-way interaction pattern was given by Dav-
elaar and Stevens (2009) and is essentially a weaker version of
the feature-integration account. In particular, the assumption is
that only complete matches lead to faster response times, whereas
complete mismatches are equal to incomplete matches.
Even though the account put forward by Davelaar and Stevens
(2009) captures the three-way interaction, it does not specify the
relative importance of repeating the target, response, and flankers.
In other words, in the feature-integration account relevant features
are bound into an event file, but Davelaar and Stevens (2009) did
not state what does and what does not get bound. At first blush,
1Some studies still reported an interaction when the target/response does not repeat
across trials (Ullsperger et al., 2005; Notebaert and Verguts, 2006; Verbruggen et al.,
2006). However, these studies used different methodologies (e.g., very short pre-
sentation durations or using a large set of numbers instead of two arrows) than
the studies listed. Egner et al. (2010) observed an inverse correlation between the
congruency sequence effect and the temporal separation between consecutive tri-
als. This highlights the impact of seemingly arbitrary methodological choices, such
as timing and stimulus material. The current work aims to address explicitly what
underlies the three-way interaction between previous trial type, current trial type,
and target/response repetition by using methods that are known to give rise to the
three-way interaction. Future work could investigate why some studies failed to
replicate this three-way interaction effect.
one would assume that the relevant features are the target and the
response, but this would merely produce faster responses when
the target/response repeats. Clearly, the flankers, despite being
destined to be ignored, are included in the event files. The fact
that they are not at all ignored is obvious from the existence of the
flanker interference effect. What is not obvious is how the flankers
are bound in the event file and what role they play in congruency
sequence effects. To address this, we need a detailed account of how
the task set or task instructions get represented by a participant.
As will become clear in the next section, a very specific interpreta-
tion of the term “event file” is used together with a feature binding
account of task representations.
A FEATURE BINDING ACCOUNT OF TASK SET REPRESENTATIONS
In typical laboratory settings, experimental paradigms present the
participant with novel combinations of stimuli and responses.
In order for the participant to follow the instructions required
for the experimental task, an internal representation of the task
is required in the form of task goals or task sets. These rep-
resentations encode the task rules and can thus be assumed to
correspond to a set of IF-THEN statements. Initially, these rules
are maintained in declarative memory until the task becomes well-
practiced and transferred to procedural memory. According to
Davelaar (2011), goal representations are bindings of represen-
tations related to the stimuli and responses. The representation
that binds the various subcomponents can be likened to an event
file. However, the process by which the event file is formed may
require two levels of associative learning. Figure 2 illustrates
the creation of two rules that are employed in the flanker task,
using the analogy of neurons in a brain area, presumably the
prefrontal cortex (Dehaene et al., 1998). A pool of non-specific
neurons exist that have the latent ability to form connections
with other intra-pool neurons and with extra-pool representa-
tions, such as motor representations (indicated by circles with
hands) and location-specific stimulus representations (indicated
by circles with arrows). Let us assume that weak random connec-
tions exist from every extra-pool representation to the neuronal
pool. When an instruction is given, extra-pool representations
activate the units in the pool that happen (by chance) to be con-
nected to them. In the example, the sentence phrase “When you
see a right-pointing arrow. . .” activated the 31 units within the
red enclosure. The next sentence phrase “. . .you press the right
button” activated the units in the black enclosure. Importantly,
only the units that were activated both during the first and sec-
ond phrase will remain active and have pre-existing, albeit weak,
connections with the extra-pool representations of the middle
right-pointing arrow and the right motor program. The instruc-
tions also mention ignoring the left-pointing arrows on the left
and the right. Instead of excluding these from the final repre-
sentation of 5 units, they are integral to development of the
goal representation. The 5 units will be strongly active, which
lead to strengthening of the associative connections among them
(see Figure 2; first level of associative learning) and with the
extra-pool representations (second level of associative learning).
The newly formed representation needs both levels of associative
learning to be effective as a task representation. The intra-pool
connectivity leads to a process of pattern completion: whenever
www.frontiersin.org January 2013 | Volume 3 | Article 552 | 3
Davelaar Priming and cognitive control
FIGURE 2 | Development of task representations in the flanker task. (A)
instruction for incongruent trials. (B) instruction for congruent trials. When the
instructions are given, a subset of a pool of uncommitted neurons gets
activated. With every new phrase in the instruction, overlapping pools of
neurons are activated, but only those neurons in the overlapping region
remain active and eventually become the representation of the instructed
task rule. In the flanker task, target, response, and flanker information are
bound into a single task representation. The example instructions are
consistent across the two congruency conditions, even though in practice the
flankers need not be ignored in congruent trials.
one of the units becomes active, the entire assembly becomes
active.
The initial fragile new representation will continue to
strengthen during the practice trials and be sensitive to rein-
forcement signals. Computational theories of instruction learning
and task goal representations typically use slow reinforcement-
based learning algorithms (Dehaene et al., 1998; Sutton and Barto,
1998; Doll et al., 2009) and are thus only applicable at stages after
initial creation of the task representation. This includes conflict-
modulated learning (Davelaar, 2009). By using the pool of uncom-
mitted neurons, a novel task representation can easily be created
and kick-start the development of a more stable representation
that eventually will lead to automatization of the task. As the stim-
uli differ in the amount of conflict they trigger, an asymmetry is
expected whereby the task representations of incongruent stimuli
compared to congruent stimuli undergo more changes in con-
nectivity. The fate of distracting information is interesting, as it is
associated with a response, but contextualized via the target. In the
example, left-pointing distractors are included in both the top and
bottom representations, but are associated with different responses
(right and left, respectively). This perspective contrasts with views
that ignored flankers would be associated with a “do-not-respond”
tag as assumed in some theories of in negative priming (Neill et al.,
1992; see for reviews, Mayr and Buchner, 2007; Schrobsdorff et al.,
2012). The issue of putative negative priming in the flanker task
will be discussed in the discussion.
In the account put forward here, the verbal instructions give rise
to task representations,which through associative learning become
strengthened further. This particular representation remains avail-
able during the entire experiment and increases in internal and
external connectivity. Thus, this is a weight-based representation
that stabilizes over protracted time. This contrasts with the fleet-
ing event file referred to by Hommel and colleagues. According
to their view, the event file resulting from feature-integration
processes is of a transient nature (Colzato et al., 2006; Hommel
and Colzato, 2009). These approaches are not incompatible. In
fact, they form part of a continuum of various binding processes
(cf. Colzato et al., 2006) that operate over different time-scales.
In particular, one could consider the possibility that the transient
event file could be the activated part of the task set and other
salient activations. In other words, the transient event file may
be the activated task representation. This distinction between a
short-lasting activation-based representation and a longer-lasting
weight-based representation has a long history in the memory lit-
erature (e.g., James, 1890; Norman, 1968; Shiffrin, 1976; Cowan,
1988) and computational theories (e.g., Davelaar et al., 2006) have
explicated the interactions between these levels.
In the current study, the focus is on the presence of flanker
information in the task representation and therefore flanker infor-
mation will be present in the fleeting event file which influences
responses in subsequent trials. This leads to two predictions. First,
repeating flankers across trials should contribute to response repe-
tition effects irrespective of whether the target repeats across trials.
The flankers will continue to activate the previous task representa-
tion, which should facilitate complete reactivation. This is investi-
gated in Experiment 1. Second, in the absence of responses on the
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previous trial, flankers should still prime the task representations,
resulting in response facilitation on the following trial. This is
investigated in Experiment 2 and is a consequence of the asym-
metry in connection strength for incongruent and congruent task
representations. Finding such a pattern of results supports the
view that flankers are bound together with target and response
information into a unique task representation and that this task
representation is sensitive to cross-trial reactivations. This view
is congruent with the findings that associative learning processes
(as involved in creating the intra- and extra-pool connections)
and the binding processes underlying event file creation (acti-
vation level of task representations) are different (Colzato et al.,
2006).
SEQUENTIAL EFFECTS: WHAT NEEDS TO BE REPEATED?
The Eriksen flanker paradigm has provided critical insights into
the spatiotemporal processes involved in visuospatial attention
(Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). Yet, the observation of cross-trial
dependencies has attracted a lot of attention. This may be partly
due to the explicit detail in prominent conflict/control theo-
ries (Botvinick et al., 2001) and partly due to leading contender
theories (Hommel et al., 2004) that challenge core assumptions
about the need to invoke conflict-related processes. The three-way
interaction observed by Mayr et al. (2003) suggested that stimu-
lus/response repetition was all that was needed to account for the
pattern without recourse to conflict control processes. The early
version of the repetition view was silent with regard to whether the
target or the response needs to be repeated to obtain a congruency
sequence effect. Take for example the arrow-flanker task used by
Mayr et al. (2003). The transition <<><< to <<><< repeats
the response, the target character and the flankers. Is it necessary
to repeat all elements or is one or a combination of two (e.g., tar-
get and response) sufficient? To address this question one needs a
flanker paradigm in which the target, flankers, and response can
be manipulated independently. In the first experiment, a letter-
flanker task is used, in which a consonant/vowel categorization is
to be made on the central letter and has three types of stimuli:
stimuli in which flankers (i.e., the distractors) are identical to the
target (e.g., AAAAA: congruent; CO), different from the target but
from the same category (e.g., EEAEE: stimulus-incongruent; SI),
or are from a different category than the target (e.g., KKAKK: RI).
The general finding is that RI-trials are slower than either CO- and
SI-trials (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974; Miller, 1991). The first exper-
iment will make use of this task. The second experiment will use
arrows instead of characters. In this arrow-flanker task, congru-
ent, and incongruent trials are those in which the flanking arrows
point in the same (e.g., <<<<<, >>>>>) or different (e.g.,
<<><<, >><>>) directions than the central target arrow. In
the arrow-flanker task, the incongruent trials are both SI- and RI.
Using a letter-flanker task, response- and target-repetitions can
be disentangled. It is possible that merely repeating the response
is sufficient to speed up responding to a RI-stimulus after a RI-
trial (e.g., KKAKK followed by BBEBB) compared to the same
RI-stimulus after a CO-trial (e.g., AAAAA followed by BBEBB).
Davelaar and Stevens (2009) reported an analysis from a study
using a consonant/vowel categorization task, showing that the
two-way interaction effect (previous x current trial type) was
only observed when the target and flankers repeated across tri-
als. Although this supports the view that the entire stimulus array
needs to be repeated across trials to observe facilitation, it is also
consistent with the view that flankers need to be repeated (Frings
et al., 2007) together with the response. If a two-way interac-
tion is found when flankers repeat while targets change (e.g.,
KKEKK followed by KKAKK), the repetition view needs to be
updated to include the possibility that the flankers, despite being
irrelevant (cf. Jaswal, 2012), are bound in episodic memory (i.e.,
activates the task representation) and can drive the sequential
effects.
In a study that obtained the Gratton effect (i.e., the two-way
interaction between previous and current trial type) when stim-
uli do not repeat across trials, Notebaert and Verguts (2006)
proposed that stimulus conflict could contribute to the effect.
Stimulus conflict is present when the flankers and target are dif-
ferent characters that are associated with the same response. Their
study employed a numerical flanker task, which differs concep-
tually from the arrow-flanker task used in the original study by
Mayr et al. (2003). The consonant/vowel categorization variant,
as used here in Experiment 1, is conceptually closer due to the
small set size (four letters versus two arrows versus ten digits)
and a direct manipulation of stimulus conflict. It is possible that
stimulus conflict, which is also present in RI-trials, underlies the
conflict-modulated effect, as suggested by Verbruggen et al. (2006).
This is yet unknown for a flanker paradigm using letters instead
of numbers (Notebaert and Verguts, 2006), or colors (Verbruggen
et al., 2006).
Finally, several researchers have suggested computational
accounts in which monitored conflict modulates associative
strengths (Blais et al., 2007; Verguts and Notebaert, 2008; Davelaar,
2009; Davelaar and Stevens, 2009). Evidence supporting this view
comes from finding a larger speed up for repeated RI stimuli than
for repeated CO stimuli (Davelaar and Stevens, 2009). Comparing
RI- with CO-trials necessarily confounds stimulus-conflict with
response conflict. The consonant/vowel variant of the flanker task
deconfounds these factors and allows an assessment of the relation
between type of conflict and the priming effect.
The present investigation aims to contribute to the literature
by addressing the following questions. First, can the three-way
interaction that supported the original repetition view by Mayr
et al. (2003) be replicated in a consonant/vowel flanker para-
digm? Second, what type of repetition (target, flanker, response,
or a combination) is needed to obtain the two-way interac-
tion between previous and current trial type? Answers to these
questions provide critical boundary conditions for models of
cognitive control and those that focus on the flanker task in
particular. Specifically, knowing what type of information needs
to be repeated will force the theorist to develop models that
explicitly process this information. To preview the results, the
observation that repeating the flankers and response are nec-
essary suggests that flankers are not simply ignored, but form
an integral part of any ensuing control process. Experiment 1
uses the letter-flanker task, while Experiment 2 uses an arrow-
flanker task that singles out a critical pattern found in Experi-
ment 1 and is predicted by the feature binding account of task
representations.
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Twelve participants (six women, mean age= 26) from the Univer-
sity of London were tested individually and received a remunera-
tion of £7 for their time.
Stimuli and procedure
Stimuli consisted of five horizontally arranged capital letters. The
letters used were: A, E, B, and K. The letters were arranged to
create three types of stimuli: congruent (CO: AAAAA, EEEEE,
KKKKK, BBBBB), stimulus-incongruent (SI: EEAEE, AAEAA,
KKBKK, BBKBB), and RI (RI: BBABB, KKAKK, BBEBB, KKEKK,
AABAA, EEBEE, AAKAA, EEKEE). To avoid biases in expecting
a subset of stimulus transitions, all possible stimulus transitions
were included. Stimuli were presented in black font on a white
background. Participants were instructed to respond to the cen-
tral target letter by pressing the “z” or “/”-key on the keyboard
when the letter is a consonant or a vowel. The category-response
mapping was counterbalanced across participants. The instruc-
tion was followed by a practice block of 48 trials (16 trials per
condition). Each trial started with five dashes in gray font for
1,000 ms followed by the flanker stimulus presented for a maxi-
mum of 1,500 ms. Following the practice, participants completed
12 experimental blocks testing each condition 32 times. All blocks
were followed by feedback regarding the accuracy and average
response time. Participants were instructed to aim for an average
response time of less than 1 s and to maintain accuracy above 80%
correct.
RESULTS
Across participants and conditions, accuracy varied between 88
and 99%. There was a main effect of condition in both accuracy
[F(2,22)= 14.33, MSE< 0.001, p < 0.001, η2= 0.56] and correct
RTs [F(2,22)= 66.63, MSE= 55.77, p < 0.001, η2= 0.86]. Accu-
racy was lowest (92%) and correct RTs were slowest (518 ms) in
the RI condition. Accuracy (95 vs. 96%) and correct RT (486
vs. 490 ms) did not differ between CO and SI conditions (all
ps> 0.08). In addressing the two questions set out in the intro-
duction, repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the
accuracies and the RTs conditioned on the previous and cur-
rent trial being correct (a standard procedure in this literature).
As the various repetition effects do not allow a full factorial
analysis, analyses were focused on the relevant parts of the data
that address the questions. Table 1 presents correct RTs and
error rates for all conditions (see Table 2 for examples). For
correct RTs, an overall 3 (previous trial type)× 3 (current trial
type)× 3 (repetition status) factorial ANOVA that included trials
with flanker repetitions revealed main effects of current trial type
[F(2,22)= 39.45, MSE= 650.89, p < 0.001, η2= 0.78] and rep-
etition [F(2,22)= 62.81, MSE= 2087.41, p < 0.001, η2= 0.85],
a two-way interaction between previous and current trial
type [F(4,44)= 7.83, MSE= 357.31, p < 0.001, η2= 0.42], and a
three-way interaction [F(8,88)= 4.33, MSE= 425.49, p < 0.001,
η2= 0.28]. For error rates, there were main effects of previ-
ous trial type [F(2,22)= 6.05, MSE= 0.001, p < 0.01, η2= 0.36],
current trial type [F(2,22)= 14.66, MSE= 0.001, p < 0.001,
η2= 0.57], and repetition [F(2,22)= 20.35, MSE= 0.004,
p < 0.001, η2= 0.65], but no three-way interaction. The interac-
tions in the RT data can be understood through addressing the
questions, to which we turn now.
Question 1: Is there a three-way interaction?
Figure 3A presents the correct RTs across the CO/RI conditions for
which the transitions involve both response and target-repetitions.
These conditions constitute the typical conditions used in previous
experiments and involve response conflict and stimulus conflict.
Replicating previous results, the two-way interaction is present for
CO- and RI-trials, when the target and the response repeat, but is
absent when there is no repetition. A repeated measures ANOVA
crossing the factors current trial (CO vs. RI), previous trial (CO
vs. RI), and repetition (no repetition vs. full repetition, including
Table 1 | Mean correct response times (in ms) and error rates (in brackets), separated by flanker repetition.
Transition Previous trial type
No repetition Response repetition Target+ response repetition
CO SI RI CO SI RI CO SI RI
RI 541 (0.06) 544 (0.09) 546 (0.11)b 518 (0.11) 516 (0.10) 528 (0.07) 475 (0.03)b 469 (0.02) 462 (0.04)b
RI-repeata 524 (0.08)bd 527 (0.04)d 536 (0.07)f 489 (0.05)e 437 (0.03)e
SI 504 (0.05)c 505 (0.05)c 506 (0.05) 479 (0.05) 486 (0.03) 458 (0.03)c 452 (0.01)
SI-repeata 511 (0.09)d 495 (0.04) 433 (0.02)c
CO 503 (0.06)bc 501 (0.04)c 506 (0.06) 473 (0.05) 471 (0.04) 491 (0.06) 430 (0.01)c 437 (0.02)b
CO-repeata 506 (0.11)bd 418 (0.01)bc
CO, congruent; SI, stimulus-incongruent; RI, response-incongruent.
aX-repeat refers to the X-condition in which the flankers repeat from the previous trial. bThese eight conditions are used in the analysis in question 1 on response
conflict. cThese eight conditions are used in the analysis in question 1 on stimulus conflict. dThe effect of flanker repetition on RTs was not significant (p>0.09 for
all pairwise comparisons). eThe effect of flanker repetition on RTs was significant (p<0.05 for all pairwise comparisons). fThis trial is a RI–RI transition in which the
flankers do not become the target. The difference with the corresponding negative priming type transition was not significant (p>0.55).
The bold values feature in the target vs. flanker repetition analysis.
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Table 2 | Examples of stimuli used in Experiment 1 by condition.
Transition Previous trial type
No repetition Response repetition Target+ response repetition
CO BBBBB SI BBKBB RI AABAA CO EEEEE SI AAEAA RI BBEBB CO AAAAA SI EEAEE RI BBABB
RI KKAKK KKAKK BBABBb BBABB BBABB KKAKK BBABBb BBABB KKAKKb
RI-repeata BBABBb BBABB BBEBBd BBABB BBABB
SI EEAEEc EEAEEc EEAEE EEAEE EEAEE EEAEEc EEAEE
SI-repeata AAEAA EEAEE EEAEEc
CO AAAAAbc AAAAAc EEEEE AAAAA AAAAA AAAAA AAAAAc AAAAAb
CO-repeata AAAAAb AAAAAbc
CO, congruent; SI, stimulus-incongruent; RI, response-incongruent.
aX-repeat refers to the X-condition in which the flankers repeat from the previous trial. bThese eight conditions are used in the analysis in question 1 on response
conflict. cThese eight conditions are used in the analysis in question 1 on stimulus conflict. dThis trial is a RI–RI transition in which the flankers do not become the
target.
FIGURE 3 | Mean correct RTs as a function of current trial type and previous trial type. (A) CO/RI combinations that include response conflict.
(B) CO/SI combinations that include only stimulus conflict. Examples of previous and current trials are presented in brackets. CO, congruent; SI, stimulus-
incongruent; RI, response-incongruent.
flankers) revealed a significant three-way interaction in the RT data
[F(1,11)= 11.82, MSE= 731.31, p < 0.01,η2= 0.52]. As expected
this three-way interaction was due to a previous× current trial
type interaction when target/response repeated [F(1,11)= 34.90,
MSE= 283.01, p < 0.001, η2= 0.76], which was absent when rep-
etition was absent [p= 0.21, η2= 0.14]. This replicates the three-
way interaction previously reported in experiments using arrows
as stimuli.
The remaining analyses take advantage of the task mapping
two letters onto a single response, i.e., the SI conditions and
flanker-non-repetitions.
Figure 3B presents the correct RTs across the CO/SI condi-
tions for which the transitions involve both response and target-
repetitions. These conditions do not involve any response con-
flict, but do have stimulus conflict. A similar repeated measures
ANOVA using these CO and SI-trials revealed a three-way interac-
tion [F(1,11)= 14.14, MSE= 179.05, p < 0.005,η2= 0.56], which
was due to a previous× current trial type interaction when tar-
get/response repeats [F(1,11)= 22.62, MSE= 187.74, p < 0.01,
η2= 0.67], but not when the target/response changes [p= 0.67,
η2= 0.02]. In other words, the data reveals a previous× current
trial type interaction effect in the absence of response conflict.
Question 2: What type of repetition is needed to obtain the Gratton
effect?
In both analyses focusing on response and stimulus conflict, both
the target and response repeated across trials. In addition, the
repeated CO–CO, SI–SI, and RI–RI transitions also repeated the
flankers from one trial to the next. To address question 2, the focus
is on Figure 4, which contains transitions that do not repeat the
flankers. We conducted a 2× 2 ANOVA on the data (with CO and
RI as previous trial types) with the RI–RI transition that includes
flanker repetition (e.g., BBEBB followed by BBABB) and one that
includes flanker change (e.g., BBEBB followed by KKAKK). There
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FIGURE 4 | Mean correct RTs as a function of current trial type and
previous trial type for trial sequences that have response repetition, but
no target repetition. The RI–RI transitions can be split into trials that have
flanker repetition (BBEBB followed by BBABB) and trials that have not
(BBEBB followed by KKAKK). Examples of previous and current trials are
presented in brackets. CO: congruent; RI: response-incongruent.
was no previous× current trial type interaction effect when the
flankers changed (RI–RI transition= 528 ms; p= 0.68,η2= 0.02),
but there was with flanker repetition (RI–RI transition= 489 ms)
[F(1,11)= 9.4, MSE= 698.76, p < 0.05, η2= 0.46].
No flanker repetition effects were found when the target and
response change across trials (all ps> 0.09). With regard to the
priming effects following different types of conflict, the RI-
priming effect is numerically larger than the SI-priming effect
(38 ms vs. 25 ms), but the sizes are not statistically different
(p > 0.10).
DISCUSSION
The results can be summarized as follows. There are four effects in
the data: an overall flanker interference effect (EEEEE vs. BBEBB),
a response repetition effect (EEEEE followed by BBBBB vs. EEEEE
followed by AAAAA), a combined target and response repeti-
tion effect (KKEKK followed by BBABB vs. KKEKK followed
by BBEBB), and a flanker repetition effect (KKEKK followed by
BBABB vs. KKEKK followed by KKAKK). Whereas none of these
effects are controversial, the combination of these produces the
three-way interaction effect between previous trial, current trial,
and target/response repetition that has been discussed in the cog-
nitive control literature (Mayr et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006;
Davelaar and Stevens, 2009). Importantly, the current experiment
used a methodology involving letters, a non-spatial categorical
judgment, and multiple target characters mapping onto a single
response. Thus, the three-way interaction can not be attributed
to the use of arrows as stimuli and confounding target repetition
with response repetition.
We set out to address two questions. First, can the three-way
interaction be replicated in a consonant-vowel flanker paradigm?
Second, what type of repetition (target, flanker, response, or a
combination) is needed to obtain the Gratton effect? The answer
to the first question is unequivocally “Yes!.” In addition, the results
show for the first time that this three-way interaction is present in
both CO/RI combinations and CO/SI combinations. Therefore,
the interaction is not dependent on response conflict. However,
this description in terms of response and stimulus conflict is qual-
ified by the findings to the second question. The analyses revealed
that when nothing repeats across trials, the two-way interaction
between current and previous trial type, which defines the Grat-
ton effect, is absent. The interaction is also absent when only the
response repeats. To obtain the two-way interaction at least the
flankers and the response need to be repeated across trials. This
finding supports the view that flanker repetition (in the absence of
target repetition) contributes to the Gratton effect. Previously, the
flanker benefit has been demonstrated by Frings et al. (2007) using
a negative priming paradigm. Here, flankers are shown to critically
contribute to congruency sequence effects that were previously
attributed to global attentional control processes.
In relation to the conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick et al.,
2001), the results revealed that conflict by itself does not pro-
duce a Gratton effect and that stimulus repetition seems to govern
its presence. The experiment did not show a Gratton effect after
RI and SI conflict when nothing repeats across trials. In one
study, Verbruggen et al. (2006) found a marginal interaction effect
between previous trial type (CO vs. SI) and current trial type
(CO vs. SI), but did not report any statistics or effect sizes. In fol-
lowing Davelaar and Stevens (2009), the size of the RI-priming
effect (RTEEEEE followed by KKEKK−RTKKEKK followed by KKEKK) was
larger than the SI-priming effect (RTEEEEE followed by AAEAA−
RTAAEAA followed by AAEAA). Within the associative learning theory
that uses conflict-modulated learning (Davelaar and Stevens, 2009;
see also Blais et al., 2007; Verguts and Notebaert, 2008) this could
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be interpreted to mean that response conflict is a stronger learning
signal than stimulus conflict. However, the statistics did not sup-
port the numerical difference. This aspect would benefit from
further research.
EXPERIMENT 2
In the first experiment, flanker repetition contributed to the
previous× current trial type interaction when the response also
repeated. This is consistent with a theoretical view in which traces
are formed in episodic memory during the instruction phase and
contain information about the flankers and the response. Target
information would also be stored in the trace. These episodic traces
are different, but related, to what Hommel (1998; Hommel et al.,
2004) refers to as event files. At the current stage in the theoret-
ical development, it is assumed that these episodic traces form
the task representations and that short-lived event files are the
activations of these representations. In other words, the relation
between event files and task representation is analogous to the rela-
tion between short-term memory and long-term memory within
the activation-based approach (e.g., James, 1890; Norman, 1968;
Shiffrin, 1976; Cowan, 1988). This reinterpretation of event files
allows for integration with the literature on memory and executive
function (Davelaar et al., 2005; Davelaar, 2011) and underscores
the breadth of binding processes proposed (Colzato et al., 2006).
Whether the activation-based approach can be distinguished from
Hommel’s event files depends on the definitions and characteris-
tics attributed to them. Nevertheless, in the current incarnation
as activated task representations, any bound element, including
flankers, could lead to congruency sequence effects.
To truly assess whether flanker repetition contributes to the
congruency sequence effect, only flanker information should be
presented. In Experiment 2 some of the trials are preceded only
by flankers. As there is no target, no response is needed. If the
task representation includes flanker information, then merely pre-
senting flankers should lead to (partial) reactivation of those
representations and subsequently to (pseudo)repetition effects.
This prediction follows from the observation that task rules are
activated despite being unnecessary for a given trial (see Hommel
et al., 2004, for a review). Congruency sequence effects have been
observed when no response on the previous trial was made (Hom-
mel et al., 2004, experiment 3), indicating that features presenting
in a preceding trial can activate task rules that have their influence
on subsequent trials.
Critical in the current theorizing is the assumption that the
strengthening of the intra- and extra-pool connections is modu-
lated by reinforcement and conflict signals. Thus the more conflict,
the larger the change in connection strength (Davelaar, 2009). This
leads to an asymmetry, whereby the task representations for incon-
gruent stimuli have stronger connections than those for congruent
stimuli. This means that flankers tend to activate the incongruent
task representation more than the congruent one.
Consider the four possible scenarios: >> >> followed by
>>>>>, >> >> followed by >><>>, >> >> followed
by <<<<<, and >> >> followed by <<><<. The flankers
>> >> do not predict the stimulus on the following trial, but
this set of flankers has stronger connections with the task repre-
sentation“IF>><>>THEN left button”than with“IF>>>>>
THEN right button.” This produces a competitive advantage that
leads to faster responses when the stimulus >><>> is presented.
Thus, even though no target or response has occurred on the pre-
vious trial, the content of the event file includes the activated task
representation, which in turn facilitates responses on the next trial




Eighteen participants (12 women, mean age= 29 years) for the
University of London were tested in individually and received a
remuneration of £8 for their time.
Stimuli and procedure
Stimuli consisted of five horizontally arranged arrowheads, mak-
ing up congruent (<<<<< and >>>>>) and incongruent
(<<><< and >><>>) trials. Stimuli were presented in black
font on a white background. Participants were instructed to
respond to the central target arrowhead by pressing the “z” or
“/”-key on the keyboard when the arrow pointed to the left or
the right, respectively. On 25% of the trials the target would be
absent (blank space) and participants should withhold respond-
ing for 1,000 ms. This produced four new sequences: incongruent
and congruent trials that were preceded by similar or different
flankers. The instruction was followed by a practice block of 64
pairs of trials. Each pair of trials started with a blank interval
for 1,000 ms followed by the first flanker stimulus, presented for
a maximum of 1,500 ms, followed by another blank interval and
finally the second flanker stimulus. From the viewpoint of the par-
ticipant, each block consisted of 128 independent trials. Feedback
on accuracy and reaction time was given after the practice block
and after each experimental block. Participants were instructed to
aim for an average response time of less than 1 s and to maintain
accuracy above 80%. After the practice block, participants com-
pleted eight experimental blocks, testing each unique responding
condition 32 times and each of the sequences with flankers only
trials 64 times.
RESULTS
A 2× 2× 2 within-subject ANOVA with previous trial type
(repeating response versus non-repeating response), current
trial type, and target/response repetition as factors was con-
ducted, followed by a 2× 2 ANOVA on the no response
flanker repetition trials. The results are presented in Table 3
and Figure 5. Incongruent trials were slower and less accu-
rate than congruent trials [RT: F(1,17)= 142.41, MSE= 1565.81,
p < 0.001, η2= 0.150; error: F(1,17)= 22.39, MSE= 0.005,
p < 0.001, η2= 0.568]. There was a main effect of previ-
ous trial type on error rates [F(1,17)= 13.36, MSE= 0.002,
p < 0.005, η2= 0.440], but not on RTs (p > 0.10) and a main
effect of repetition for RTs [F(1,17)= 17.41, MSE= 656.11,
p= 0.001, η2= 0.506], but not for error rates (p= 0.612).
All two-way interactions for error rates were significant
[previous× current: F(1,17)= 110.03, MSE= 0.001, p < 0.01,
η2= 0.371; previous× repetition: F(1,17)= 6.05, MSE= 0.003,
p < 0.05,η2= 0.263; current× repetition: F(1,17)= 10.22,MSE=
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Table 3 | Mean correct response times (in ms) and error rates (in brackets), separated by previous trial type, current trial type, repetition, and
flanker only trials.
Current trial type Previous trial type
No repetition Target/response repetition Flankers only
Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent Change Repeat
Incongruent 511 (0.05) 522 (0.06) 528 (0.12) 476 (0.03) 535 (0.07) 506 (0.04)
Congruent 434 (0.02) 448 (0.01) 416 (0) 424 (0) 436 (0.01) 436 (0.01)
FIGURE 5 | Mean correct RTs as a function of current trial type and previous trial type for Experiment 2. Examples of previous and current trials are
presented in brackets. INC, incongruent; CON, congruent.
0.001, p= 0.005, η2= 0.375], and all but the current
trial type× repetition interaction for RTs [previous× current:
F(1,17)= 26.13, MSE= 331.35, p < 0.001, η2= 0.606; pre-
vious× repetition: F(1,17)= 25.42, MSE= 414.32, p < 0.001,
η2= 0.599; current× repetition: p= 0.287]. These interactions
were qualified by significant three-way interaction in both
the RTs [F(1,17)= 20.41, MSE= 359.31, p < 0.001, η2= 0.546]
and error rates [F(1,17)= 11.85, MSE= 0.002, p < 0.005,
η2= 0.411]. These three-way interactions are due to the pres-
ence of a previous× current trial type interaction when the
target/response repeats [RT: F(1,17)= 40.42, MSE= 394.90,
p < 0.001, η2= 0.704; error rate: F(1,17)= 14.41, MSE= 0.003,
p= 0.001,η2= 0.459], but not when it changes (ps> 0.37). These
results replicate the basic pattern presented in previous reports
(Mayr et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006; Davelaar and Stevens,
2009).
In this experiment, the trials that were preceded by
flankers only and did not require any response are the
main focus. A 2× 2 ANOVA revealed a significant effect of
current trial type [F(1,17)= 134.14, MSE= 950.30, p < 0.001,
η2= 0.888] and an effect of flanker repetition [F(1,17)= 26.69,
MSE= 133.69, p < 0.001, η2= 0.628]. Importantly, these main
effects were qualified by a significant interaction [F(1,17)= 27.38,
MSE= 141.18, p < 0.001, η2= 0.617], which was due to an
effect of flanker repetition on incongruent trials [t (17)= 5.93,
p < 0.001], but not on congruent trials (p > 0.98).
The final statistical comparison that tests the view that the
three-way interaction is due to flanker repetition is to correlate the
two-way interaction in repetition trials (M = 58.9, SD= 9.6) with
the flanker repetition effect in the incongruent trials (M = 25.1,
SD= 2.7). This correlation was significant (r = 0.63, p < 0.01) and
suggested that 40% of the variance in the two-way interaction is
accounted for by flanker repetition in the incongruent trials. In
order to put this finding in perspective, all four pairwise effects
(flanker effect in flanker change and flanker repetition trials and
flanker repetition effect in congruent and incongruent trials) were
entered as predictors for the critical two-way interaction effect.
The overall multiple regression was significant [F(3,13)= 4.68,
MSE= 988.84, p < 0.05, R2= 0.52]. Of the predictors, only the
flanker repetition effect in incongruent trials remained significant
[t (13)= 2.60, p < 0.05] and accounted uniquely for 34.1% of the
variance in the two-way interaction effect. The other predictors
were not significant (ps> 0.23). As a final check, when a two-
way ANOVA was run with factors previous trial type and current
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trial type for the repetition only trials (iCr, iIr, cCr, cIr) with the
flanker repetition effect in incongruent trials entered as a covari-
ate, the two-way interaction was not significant [F(1,15)= 0.015,
MSE= 269.10, p= 0.905, η2= 0.001].
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 provides strong evidence for the view that repeti-
tions of flankers partially drive the previous× current trial type
interaction. First, it shows that there is no need to make a response
or even to see a target in order to get an interaction. Importantly,
the non-necessity of a response and a target on the preceding trial
shows that response conflict and stimulus conflict are not nec-
essary to observe a speed up in response times in incongruent
trials. Second, it places the locus of the effect squarely on process-
ing of incongruent trials. Theories that attribute the congruency
sequence effect only to conflict-related processing will have dif-
ficulties accommodating these findings unless other mechanisms
are included.
One such mechanism, as suggested by one reviewer, could be
negative priming, which is known to influence response times on
subsequent trials in the absence of responding on a preceding trial
or trial frame. Presenting the flankers on the first trial will help the
participant learn about their irrelevance and thereby tagging them
as such in a “conventional” event file that binds the flankers to an
internal“ignore”response. Of course this scenario implies that fea-
ture bindings in an event file can include representations that are
neither stimulus-related nor response-related, but are“cognition”-
related. That is, event files may include bindings to cognitive states.
Extending the breadth of what is bound in an event file is one direc-
tion of current research efforts (Colzato et al., 2006; Hommel and
Colzato, 2009), but even this version fails to capture the entire data
set. In particular, if an internal “ignore” response is bound to the
flankers, the presentation of a stimulus with target and flankers
constitutes a partial match. According to the feature-integration
account, the sequences with flanker only trials with flanker rep-
etitions should be slower than those with flanker change, which
constitute complete mismatches. If we make a different arbitrary
assumption that“ignore”responses do not contribute to mismatch
calculations, but lead to actually ignoring the flankers in the subse-
quent trial, incongruent trials should become faster and congruent
trial become slower. Although this is an interaction that matches
Figure 1A, it is not the interaction found in the experiment, which
matches Figure 1C.
It is not inconceivable that a specific feature-integration
account can be given for this particular finding, but the scenario
put forward here is the following. The assumption is that flankers
are part of task representations that include response informa-
tion. Therefore when >>>> is presented both the “IF >>>>>
THEN right button” and the “IF >><>> THEN left button” task
representations are activated with a competitive advantage for the
latter. Only when flankers repeat is the corresponding response
(i.e., pressing the left button) in the most active task represen-
tation facilitated. This results in an interaction between flanker
repetition and congruency that is entirely driven by flanker repe-
tition in incongruent trials. In addition, this facilitation underlies
the congruency sequence effect in the sequences with complete
stimuli, as shown by the regression analyses.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current experiments addressed the question whether flankers,
despite the requirement to be ignored, are influencing cross-trial
congruency effects, as manifest by an interaction between pre-
vious and current trial type: the congruency sequence a.k.a. the
Gratton effect. In Experiment 1, the Gratton effect was observed
when only flankers and responses were repeated across trials. This
finding demonstrated the necessity of flanker repetition, together
with the non-necessity of target repetition and response conflict.
Experiment 2 further revealed that flanker repetition alone is suf-
ficient to produce congruency sequence-like effects, suggesting
that no conflict (stimulus or response) or an actual response is
needed to produce the effect. Moreover, using regression analy-
ses, it was shown that the congruency sequence effect is fully
accounted for by this flanker repetition effect. This is not to say
that the conflict-related mechanisms suggested in the literature do
not play a role. Statistically, there is another 65.9% of the variance
to be accounted for, but with 34.1% only due to flanker repeti-
tion this can not be ignored. However, given that the congruency
sequence effect disappeared when controlling for the interaction
due to flanker repetition, the current hypothesis is that conflict
does not contribute directly to the effect.
The experiments put important constraints on current theo-
rizing. Egner (2007) reviewed the literature on conflict tasks and
addressed the two leading alternative explanations: conflict adap-
tation and feature-integration. Both of these theories are able to
account for the two-way interaction, but for different reasons. In
the former, the interaction is due to conflict-triggered adjustment
of attentional focus. In the latter, the interaction is due to speed
up of complete matches and mismatches. As mentioned in the
introduction, the data shows that the target/response repetition is
a modulating factor. Neither theory accounts for this modulating
effect, but a minimal extension to the feature-integration account
suffices. For example, facilitation could be assumed to occur only
for complete matches and not for complete mismatches. Although
this would capture the data, it would not explain why in the flanker
task complete mismatches do not lead to facilitation, whereas in
the Simon task they do.
The theoretical view put forward here assumes that task rep-
resentations are formed at the beginning of the experiment and
are activated during the experiment when stimuli are presented.
The activation of the task representation persists after a trial is
terminated, setting up a bias, or expectation for the required
response in the next trial. Response times in the next trial are
facilitated when the stimulus matches the active task represen-
tation. The strength of the associative connections within the
task representation and with the stimulus and response repre-
sentations increase with continued use according to the associa-
tive learning rules, which are sensitive to reward and conflict.
According to this view merely repeating the flankers is suffi-
cient to activate the task representations and thereby set up
expectations about the required response on the next trial. The
experiments presented here question the role of conflict of any
type in congruency sequence effects. Instead, the proposal is that
conflict has an indirect influence by being used as a learning
signal in ongoing stabilization and proceduralization of task rep-
resentations. Other pathways through which conflict indirectly
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influence cognitive control are outlined elsewhere (Davelaar,
2009).
A recurrent critique to associative learning accounts of the
Gratton effect is that the RI–RI transition in the no repetition
situation (e.g., BBABB followed by AABAA) promotes negative
priming (Ullsperger et al., 2005; Bugg, 2008). Bugg (2008) com-
pared the critical trials against a neutral baseline and found slower
RTs for the RI–RI transition, which was interpreted to provide
support for a negative priming effect counteracting the expected
conflict-induced speed up. However, two types of evidence argue
against this interpretation. First, in a similar experiment, no such
increase in RT was found (Davelaar and Stevens, 2009). Second
and more importantly, “a similar magnitude of slowing was also
observed” (Bugg, 2008; p. 1221) on RI–RI and RI-CO transitions
(in the letter notation that would be: BBABB followed by BBBBB)
relative to the neutral conditions. Clearly, if negative priming is evi-
dent for the RI–RI transition, the same influence of the previous
flankers should produce positive priming for the RI-CO transition.
Such a pattern was never observed in the literature that focuses on
sequential effects in the Eriksen flanker task (see figures in: Mayr
et al., 2003; Ullsperger et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006; Ver-
bruggen et al., 2006; Bugg, 2008; Davelaar, 2009; Davelaar and
Stevens, 2009). This is not to say that negative priming can never
be found with a flanker paradigm. Quite the opposite. Stadler and
Hogan (1996) obtained negative and positive priming effects in a
numerical flanker task. The main discrepancy between their find-
ings and the aforementioned literature is that Stadler and Hogan
(1996) exclusively employed stimuli in which the target and the
flankers were associated with different responses. In other words,
they only used RI-trials, which may trigger a stronger requirement
and reliance on attentionally deselecting the flankers, producing
negative priming effects. To date, there is no report showing evi-
dence of negative priming in a binary flanker task that includes
incongruent and congruent trials. Even in Experiment 1, which
contained four types of RI–RI transitions, there was no evidence
for slower RTs for transitions where the flankers became the target
compared to transitions where flankers changed across trials (all
ps> 0.5).
Another recurrent comment is that as a whole, the Stroop and
Simon tasks do not show the three-way interaction and therefore
the original conflict model need not require modification. This
comment falsely implies that all three congruency tasks are equal.
Several recent reports have documented differences in response
time distributions. For example, Spieler et al. (2000) showed that
the RT distributions of incongruent Stroop, but not flanker trials
have a longer tail than the corresponding congruent trials. Pratte
et al. (2010) contrasted the Stroop and Simon tasks, revealing
that the Stroop effect increases with increasing quantiles of the
RT distribution, whereas the Simon effect decreases with increas-
ing quantiles. Davelaar (2008b) showed that RT distributions in
the flanker task are sensitive to stimulus repetition, such that the
flanker interference effect increases with increasing quantiles of the
RT distribution, unless an incongruent stimulus repeats. Together
these studies question the extent with which findings from one
task can be assumed to be obtained in another.
In conclusion, the experiments presented here adds to the body
of literature by demonstrating the considerable impact of flanker
repetition in a phenomenon previously attributed to general atten-
tional control processes. Despite the requirement of being ignored,
the flankers reactivate task representations and thereby prime cer-
tain responses on the subsequent trial. Thus, flankers are bound
in the representations that drive congruency sequence effects.
In the flanker paradigm, monitored conflict might only have a
modulatory role in adjusting associative connections of task rep-
resentations. Future research, using the flanker task, could explore
the boundary conditions of the repetition effects with regard to
the nature of event files, the influence of task representations, and
the process of conflict-modulated (indirect) control.
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